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WHAT DO AMERICA‘S FIRST PATENTS HAVE TO DO WITH 
TODAY‘S? 
Kristen Osenga
*
 
I was excited to read Michael Risch‘s latest Article, America’s First 
Patents, in large part because he and I generally agree, especially when 
it pertains to the topic of patent-eligible subject matter.
1
 In this Article, 
Professor Risch examines patent-eligible subject matter through a 
unique lens—history based on early patents. After studying a number of 
early patents, in particular those from the ―registration era‖ in patent 
law,
2
 he develops three key insights. First, he describes a disconnect 
between what inventors of the time believed to be patent-eligible and 
how the law surrounding patent-eligible subject matter developed in that 
era.
3
 Second, based on the patent applications filed by these early 
inventors, he argues that previously advanced notions of what 
constitutes ―technology‖ are inaccurate.4 Third, he demonstrates that 
reliance on the ―machine-or-transformation‖ test to determine whether 
processes are patent-eligible would knock out many historical patents 
and therefore, at the very least, has no basis in history.
5
 
I found Professor Risch‘s Article to be an interesting read and a 
refreshing take on one of the most well-worn debates in patent law—
patent-eligible subject matter; it certainly adds to the ever-growing body 
of scholarship in patent law. But with respect to his three insights, I 
think this Article proves too much and too little. On a related point, 
however, I think Professor Risch continues to hit the nail squarely on 
the head. 
I.  PROVING TOO MUCH: THE INVENTOR‘S BELIEF 
Professor Risch‘s first two insights are based on the premise that 
inventors seek patents on patent-eligible subject matter. He refers to his 
study as looking at ―inventions that Americans thought were patentable 
in our early history, without editing by the Patent Office, courts, or 
legislature‖ compared to the law of the time and our current view of 
how the founders used the word ―technology.‖6 In essence, he posits 
                                                                                                                     
 * Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. 
 1. See e.g., Michael Risch, America’s First Patents, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1279, 1302 n. 34 
(noting one of our main areas of agreement in this area). 
 2. Between 1793 and 1836, patent applications were not reviewed by the Patent Office as 
they are today; rather, nearly anyone who applied for a patent received one. See Risch, supra 
note 1, at 1282. 
 3. See id. at 1283. 
 4. See id. at 1284.  
 5. See id. at 1284–85.  
 6. See id. at 1282. He also notes that ―the primary relevance of these non-examined 
patents is . . . that they show what types of inventions inventors thought could or should be 
1
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that inventors filed patent applications on inventions they believed were 
patent-eligible, thereby illuminating what inventions were historically 
patent-eligible.
7
 But even if that argument were not circular, there are 
numerous reasons why an inventor may seek a patent on an invention 
that provides no insight into patent-eligibility. For example, considering 
first the less-than-honest inventor, he may seek a patent covering 
something that he knows is not patent-eligible because it is virtually 
certain that the patent will issue anyway during the registration era; in 
fact, the devious inventor may even use the lack of clarity in patent 
specifications at that time to further obfuscate the matter.
8
 Putting aside 
the deceitful applicant, an innocent inventor may seek a patent on 
something that is not patent-eligible simply because he did not know 
better. After all, Professor Risch cites Justice Story as remarking that 
―No one, however, in the least acquainted with law, would for a 
moment contend‖ that this subject matter is eligible for a patent.9 
Certainly in the 1800s, when information dissemination was difficult 
and inventors could not pick up a copy of a ―do-it-yourself patent 
application guide,‖10 many inventors were not acquainted with the law. 
Concluding that these early patent applications demonstrate what was 
patent-eligible is far too broad a conclusion to draw from the data.  
While I agree with the implications that Professor Risch draws from 
his data—namely that the law developed by the early courts may have 
been based on an inaccurate understanding of ―principles‖ and that 
many scholarly historic definitions of ―technology‖ are off-base—I 
think that the reliance Professor Risch places on the inventors‘ beliefs is 
too great. 
II.  PROVING TOO LITTLE: THE EXPANDING MACHINE OR 
TRANSFORMATION TEST 
Professor Risch also argues that the notion of a historically grounded 
―machine-or-transformation‖ test is inapt, in part because many early 
patent applications he studied would fail the test as now stated.
11
 He 
starts with a slippery slope argument that the ―machine-or-
transformation‖ test could be applied to all processes, even ones that 
                                                                                                                     
patentable.‖ Id.  
 7. See id. at 1303 (discussing the misguided development of patent-eligibility by noting 
that ―neither American inventors nor even the Patent Office believed patents were so limited‖). 
 8. Whether intentional or not, early patents were not terribly clear as to what was 
invented and claimed. See id. at 1287–89. 
 9. See Risch, supra note 1, at 1306 (quoting Barrett v. Hall, 2 F.Cas. 914, 923 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1818) (No. 1,047)) (emphasis added). 
 10. See, e.g., David Pressman, PATENT IT YOURSELF (NOLO Pubs. 15th ed.) (2011); 
―Patents‖ available at LegalZoom (http://www.legalzoom.com/trademarks-patents-
copyrights/patent-overview.html) (accessed July 4, 2012). 
 11. See Risch, supra note 1, at 1284. 
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clearly fit within the modern (and historic) view of patent-eligible 
subject matter.
12
 He then discusses the uncertainty of what constitutes a 
satisfactory ―machine‖ or ―transformation‖ to render the method patent-
eligible as well as the inconsistency with how the test is being applied.
13
 
With these criticisms of the ―machine-or-transformation‖ test in hand, 
Professor Risch turns to the historic patents that were identified as 
methods, noting that many of them did not include a satisfactory 
―machine‖ or ―transformation,‖ even though the invention in question 
was something that would be found patent-eligible without question 
today.
14
  
Here I think Professor Risch takes his slippery slope argument too 
far and without basis. The Patent Office and the Federal Circuit are not 
applying the ―machine-or-transformation‖ test to all method claims – 
only those that walk along the edge of patent-eligible subject matter. 
For example, claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 8,237,010, issued August 7, 
2012, recites: 
A method of manufacturing a therapeutic device for 
promoting the healing of a wound in a mammal comprising 
the steps of: 
 Providing a molten substrate material; 
 Providing a mold defining a plurality of depressions 
and a plurality of contact elements; 
 Applying the molten substrate material to the mold; 
 Cooling the molten substrate material to form the 
therapeutic device in the mold; and 
 Removing the therapeutic device from the mold 
[wherein the therapeutic device has a number of 
characteristics].
15
 
Just as in the examples cited by Professor Risch, this method is 
performed by no particular ―machine‖ and there is no 
―transformation‖ of the ingredients—basically the molten 
substrate is applied to a mold and cooled. However, the U.S. 
Patent Office did not question the patent eligibility of this 
invention, nor would anyone else realistically.
16
 Professor Risch 
                                                                                                                     
 12. See id. at 1328. 
 13. See id. at 1328–29. 
 14. See id. at 1332 (pointing out an exemplary important patent, one that describes a 
method of coating pipes with tin). 
 15. U.S. Patent No. 8,237,010 (August 7, 2012). 
 16. The transactions between the US Patent Office and the inventors is available in the 
Public Pair section of the US PTO website, available at http://www.uspto.gov/ patents/process/ 
search/public_pair/guidance/index.jsp. I looked at the transaction history for this patent and, not 
surprisingly, the Patent Office did not question its patent-eligibility. 
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is correct that ―the allure of easy decision-making beckons,‖17 
but to believe that the ―machine-or-transformation‖ test will 
suddenly be used to judge all method claims is a bit of an 
overstatement. 
The ―machine-or-transformation‖ test was never meant to be 
applied to all method claims; rather it is simply a tool, however 
imperfect, to determine what is a non-patent-eligible abstract 
idea.
18
 Many inventions, especially the low-technology ones that 
Professor Risch is concerned about (whether coating tin or 
crafting a therapeutic device), would not be remotely seen as 
abstract and thus the test would be irrelevant. 
III.  HITTING THE NAIL ON THE HEAD 
At the end of the day, the point that comes most clearly out of 
Professor Risch‘s paper is that even from the beginning of the patent 
system in this country, courts and others have confused the law of 
patent-eligible subject matter with other patent law doctrines, such as 
novelty or non-obviousness.
19
 Professor Risch cites early cases that 
deny patent protection because ―for in them there is nothing new,‖20or 
allow patent protection for ―an application of a principle, whether 
previously in existence or not, to some new and useful purpose.‖21 The 
early patents he identifies as problematic business methods feel like 
they do something, but what they do is so obvious or trivial that patent 
protection should not be accorded.
22
 Just like the business methods that 
cause the most uproar today, the problem is not really based on the fact 
that someone wants to patent a method of doing something; it‘s that the 
underlying invention feels so well-known, trivial or even ridiculous to 
us. But the appropriate area to address these concerns is not in the realm 
of patent-eligibility, but in the areas of patentability under 35 U.S.C. 
§§ 102 and 103, because, as Professor Risch has noted before—
Everything is Patentable.
23
  
                                                                                                                     
 17. See Risch, supra note 1, at 1334. 
 18. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3230 (2010) (distinguishing between a patent-
eligible process and an abstract idea (―The [Benson] Court then held the application at issue was 
not a ‗process,‘ but an unpatentable abstract idea.‖)). 
 19. See Risch, supra note 1, at 1296 (patent-eligibility vs. what was patented), 1333–34 
(patent-eligibility vs. novelty and non-obviousness). 
 20. See id. at 1297 (quoting Boulton v. Bull, 2 H. Bl. 463, 486 (1795)). 
 21. See id. at 1307 (quoting Whitney v. Carter, 29 F. Cas. 1070, 1072–73 (1810) (No. 
17,583)). 
 22. See id. at 1321–22 (describing patents on a new way to teach writing, a method of 
managing bees, and a manner of holding a skein of yarn, among others). 
 23. See Michael Risch, Everything is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591 (2008). 
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